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Recent studies have highlighted both similarities and differences between the cognitive
processing that underpins memory retrieval and that which underpins creative thinking.
To date, studies have focused more heavily on the Alternative Uses task, but fewer
studies have investigated the processing underpinning other idea generation tasks.
This study examines both Alternative Uses and Consequences idea generation with
a methods pulled from cognitive psychology, and a novel method for evaluating the
creativity of such responses. Participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk
using a custom interface allowing for requisite experimental control. Results showed
that both Alternative Uses and Consequences generation are well approximated by
an exponential cumulative response time model, consistent with studies of memory
retrieval. Participants were also slower to generate their first consequence compared
with first responses to Alternative Uses, but inter-response time was negatively related
to pairwise similarity on both tasks. Finally, the serial order effect is exhibited for both
tasks, with Consequences earning more creative evaluations than Uses. The results have
implications for burgeoning neuroscience research on creative thinking, and suggestions
are made for future areas of inquiry. In addition, the experimental apparatus described
provides an equitable way for researchers to obtain good quality cognitive data for
divergent thinking tasks.
Keywords: creativity, divergent thinking, memory search, default mode network, semantic memory
1. INTRODUCTION
Creative thinking studies have long depended on classic divergent thinking tasks as
operationalizations of the construct. With recent emergence of studies using a variety of
neuroimaging techniques to examine the cognitive roots of performance on the tasks, there became
a need for more probing cognitive analyses of divergent thinking. To some extent, this has been
done (Beaty et al., 2014; Forthmann et al., 2016; Acar and Runco, 2017; Hass, 2017a) but such
analyses have focused almost exclusively on responses to the Alternative Uses task, in which
participants are asked to generate as many creative uses for common objects as possible within
a specified time period (usually 2–3 min).
This study was motivated by several perceived gaps in both methodology and theory of another
oft-used divergent thinking task: the Consequences task (Wilson et al., 1954; Torrance, 1974). First,
when participants generate responses to prompts from the consequences task (e.g., “imagine that
humans no longer needed to sleep”), it is not altogether clear whether the idea generation process
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unfolds in a similar fashion to idea generation to Alternative Uses
prompts (e.g., “think of creative uses for a brick”). Second, it is
somewhat more difficult for judges to agree on creativity ratings
assigned to consequences responses (Silvia et al., 2008; Hass et al.,
2018). Indeed, it seems that scoring consequences tasks involves
an increase in cognitive load over the scoring of alternative uses
tasks (Forthmann et al., 2017). Finally, though other researchers
are beginning to examine response time distributions as evidence
of cognitive processing during divergent thinking (Acar and
Runco, 2017), the full scope of analyses that can be done with
response times has not fully been explicated.
The novel components of this study follow from the points
just raised. In this paper we present a web-based data collection
methodology for divergent thinking tasks (and indeed any kind
of creative thinking task that urges multiple responses), which
was designed using the tools created by the psiTurk group
(McDonnell et al., 2012). There are indeed other methods by
which one can use electronic means of collecting DT data, but the
importance of this web-based tool is that psiTurk was designed
specifically to allow researchers to collect precise cognitive
data from workers on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform
(MTurk). As such, it allows for researchers of all levels to easily
collect creative thinking data from a more representative sample
than is often available on university campuses. In addition, we
illustrate how cognitive theory can be applied to response time
data culled from both Alternative Uses and Consequences tasks.
Finally, we use a newly validated scale for measuring creativity
of responses, along with human rated similarity of responses
to compare and contrast the response generation process across
these two tasks.
1.1. Divergent Thinking and Memory
Processes
The study of divergent thinking in general has spanned
generations of creativity researchers. Though the tasks that
measure divergent thinking are disparate (e.g., Forthmann et al.,
2018), and may not be interchangeable (cf. Silvia, 2011; Runco
et al., 2016), this study was focused on cognitive analyses of the
acts of generating alternative uses for objects, and generating
consequences of impossible situations. Specifically, the central
question of this analyses was whether or not the memory
processes involved in generating these two types of divergent
thinking responses overlap, or are distinct. Do answer that
question, methods culled from the cognitive science of memory
recall were used in conjunction with methods from the creativity
literature. This section summarizes the relevant aspects of the
cognitive science of memory recall.
Several past results in the literature on memory retrieval
provide a context for the current study. First, in one of the
foundational studies on divergent thinking, Christensen et al.
(1957) plotted the number cumulative responses to various
cues as a function of time elapsed. Along with alternative uses
cues, the authors plotted results from the classic Bousfield and
Sedgewick (1944) study of cumulative responding and semantic
memory retrieval, in which they derived the well known negative
exponential function which describes the decreasing output rate
for generating category exemplars like fruits and animals. Wixted
and Rohrer (1994) reviewed the results of subsequent studies
concluding that the function is evidence of a repeated sampling of
semantic space during memory retrieval, which is then depleted
leading to more false retrievals, and an exponential slowing of
retrieval rate (see also Raaijmakers and Shiffrin, 1981). Hass
(2017a) found similar exponential slowing of response rates
when participants generated uses for objects, but also found that
generating uses yields lower response totals, and that response
arrays were looser in terms of pairwise semantic relationships (cf.
Troyer et al., 1997).
The Christensen et al. (1957) study on divergent thinking
provided more direct evidence of differences, not only between
creative idea generation and memory retrieval, but among
different idea generation prompts. First, the output totals for
divergent thinking cues were among the lowest reported (the
lowest being output totals for words containing the letters
M, T, or D, a very constraining memory retrieval task).
Second, the cumulative response curves for two divergent
thinking prompts: alternative uses for a brick, and impossibilities
(“think of all of the impossible things”), were more linear
than those for classic memory retrieval cues (e.g., U.S. cities).
The “impossibilities” prompt is similar to the more common
“consequences” prompt, with the latter simply specifying an
impossibility of which participants generate consequences, while
the former involves participants generating impossibilities with
no specific context. So on that basis, there may be little difference
in cumulative output when comparing alternative uses prompts
to consequences prompts. However, in the Christensen and
colleagues study, participants generated ideas for over 10 min,
and the cumulative response functions were plotted across 2 min
blocks. It may be that a more granular analysis of cumulative
responding will yield subtle differences in the output functions
when alternative uses and consequences prompts are compared.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that differences should exist
between the two tasks, and the argument forwarded presently is
that alternative uses responding and consequences responding
may rely on different contributions of episodic and semantic
memory and also reasoning.
1.1.1. Episodic and Semantic Memory and Divergent
Thinking
Much of the existing work on characterizing the contributions
of memory retrieval to divergent thinking has focused on
semantic memory (e.g., Gilhooly et al., 2007; Abraham and
Bubic, 2015; Kenett et al., 2016; Hass, 2017a,b). One line of
research has examined how individual differences in semantic
retrieval ability (i.e., verbal fluency or “broad retrieval ability”)
relates to divergent thinking fluency and originality. Silvia
et al. (2013) administered a battery of verbal fluency tasks,
corresponding to lower-order facets of retrieval ability (e.g.,
associational fluency; listing as many words in a given category
as possible), and found that a higher-order “retrieval ability”
factor comprised of the lower-order factors strongly predicted
the quantity and quality of ideas generated on the Alternative
Uses task, suggesting that the general ability to fluently retrieve
a range of concepts from semantic memory is central to verbal
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divergent thinking performance (see also Benedek et al., 2012;
Avitia and Kaufman, 2014). Subsequent work has found that
both controlled access to semantic memory (via verbal fluency)
and the underlying structure of semantic concepts in memory
contribute to divergent thinking (Beaty et al., 2014; Benedek
et al., 2017), lending support to so-called “dual-process” models
of creative cognition that emphasize the involvement of both top-
down (executive) and bottom-up (associative) processes (Barr
et al., 2015; Sowden et al., 2015).
Aside from the contributions of broad retrieval abilities, recent
analyses of divergent thinking using network analysis (Kenett
et al., 2014) and response time analysis (Hass, 2017a) have
illustrated that the structure of semantic memory influences
divergent thinking responding (see also Forthmann et al., 2016).
Kenett and colleagues showed that a more “flexible” semantic
network structure relates to high-divergent thinking ability
and self-reported creative achievement (Kenett et al., 2016),
likely reflecting an organization of semantic memory that is
more conducive to establishing more remote conceptual links.
Building off of Hass’s work, Xu (2017) further showed that
when constraining participants to only think of “new” ideas
during alternative uses responding, the response time functions
were more linear, yielding higher predicted output totals, and
higher originality, compared to phases in which participants were
instructed to think of “old” ideas. Finally, there seems to be
a robust serial order effect in alternative uses responses such
that early responses earn lower creativity ratings than responses
generated later in the responding interval (Christensen et al.,
1957; Beaty and Silvia, 2012; Hass, 2017b; Wang et al., 2017).
A recent verbal protocol analyses of divergent thinking,
Gilhooly et al. (2007) showed that the retrieval of known uses
for objects from episodic memory dominates initial alternative
uses responding. That result provides an explanation for the
serial order effect such that known object uses should be rated
as less creative than uses created on the spot by participants.
The results presented by Gilhooly and colleagues also spurred
a number of studies designed to test whether an “episodic
specificity induction”, an exercise where participants are trained
to retrieve details from “recent experiences”, affected the fluency
and flexibility of divergent thinking responding (e.g., Madore
et al., 2015, 2016, 2017). Madore et al. (2015) showed that the
induction enhanced the number of categories of uses (also known
as flexibility) during divergent thinking, but did not enhance the
number of objects generated in an association task. Similarly,
Madore et al. (2016) showed that the induction enhanced
responding on both an alternative uses and a consequences task.
However, in the latter study, the effects were constrained to
counts of participant-rated “old” vs. “new” responses (following
Benedek et al., 2014). Madore et al. (2016) pointed out that the
participants reported generating many more “new” responses on
the consequences task, leading them to conclude that the task
relies less on recalling specific episodes compared with alternative
uses responding.
This characterization is also in line with increasing evidence
from functional brain imaging research. Several functional
MRI studies have reported activation within a set of brain
regions collectively known as the default network (DN) when
participants are engaged in creative thinking tasks in the
scanner. The DN shows robust engagement during episodic
memory retrieval and episodic future simulation tasks, which
require the flexible recombination of episodic content (e.g.,
people, places, and actions) to reconstruct past experiences
and imagine possible future experiences (Buckner et al., 2008).
As noted above, Madore et al. (2015) have shown that an
episodic specificity induction selectively enhances performance
on the AUT, potentially reflecting the involvement of constructive
episodic retrieval mechanisms (Schacter and Madore, 2016).
A recent fMRI study involved administering the episodic
induction in the scanner and found that the induction was
associated with increased divergent thinking performance, which
corresponded to increased activity within the left anterior
hippocampus (Madore et al., 2017), a region within the DN
involved in episodic simulation. Several other studies have
reported functional connectivity (i.e., correlation in neural
responses) between regions of the DN and regions involved
in cognitive control associated with creative task performance
(Green et al., 2015; Beaty et al., 2017a,b, 2018; Gao et al.,
2017; Zhu et al., 2017; Bendetowicz et al., 2018; Chen et al.,
2018; Shi et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2018; Vartanian et al., 2018).
Cooperation between DN and control regions is thought to
reflect an interplay between idea generation and idea evaluation,
retrieving possible solutions from memory and modifying them
to fit task constraints (Beaty et al., 2016; Beaty and Schacter,
2018).
1.2. Differentiating Uses and
Consequences Tasks
The points raised in the preceding discussion lean heavily on the
use of the Alternative Uses task as the proxy measure of creative
thinking (but see Addis et al., 2016). Given that discussion,
it seems clear that Alternative Uses responding begins with a
memory search process similar to the search that unfolds when
people generate members of a well learned category. However,
as responding continues, people rely less on known instances
of an object’s use, and begin to exploit properties of objects to
discover new uses via some sort of simulation process. Individual
differences in the ability to generate creative uses has been tied
both to fluid intelligence and to functional connectivity between
cognitive control brain regions and memory-related regions
within the DN. However, it is unclear if these conclusions extend
to idea generation when the Consequences task is used as the
proxy measure of creative thinking.
As mentioned, Madore et al. (2016) provided evidence that
the reliance on episodic memory retrieval is weaker for the
consequences task, but that result requires further investigation.
There are other mechanisms that may be at work during
consequences responding beyond memory retrieval and episodic
simulation. To name one, the consequences task may require
a form of counterfactual reasoning (Byrne, 2002; Abraham and
Bubic, 2015) such that participants must consider what would
happen if an enduring property of the world changed (e.g.,
gravity ceased to exist). However, when cognitive psychologists
study counterfactual reasoning, the experimental methods often
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require participants to learn about novel situations and then
create counterfactuals using reasoning (e.g., about placing bets
Dixon and Byrne, 2011). Analysis usually focuses on how
participants’ reasoning changes based on information contained
in the description of the event (e.g., contrasting “normal”
behavior of the agent with “extraordinary” behavior). In those
studies, counterfactual reasoning is a given, and the goal is to
discover how context influences the course of reasoning. In
the consequences task specifies, a participant is supplied with a
counterfactual antecedent (if humans no longer need sleep) and
must then supply as many consequences (then humans will not
need to do X) as possible (Forthmann et al., 2017). The goal
of most studies using consequences tasks is simply to provide
a proxy of creative thinking that can be correlated with other
variables, or contrasted across groups. Thus, it may be difficult
to ascertain whether or not counterfactual reasoning is at work
during consequences responding. Still, the general hypothesis
that can be tested currently is that consequences generation
entails a lengthier processes compared with uses generation due
primarily to additional reasoning that might be required.
The aim of this study was to use response timemodels, human
rated semantic similarity, and a newly validated rating scale for
DT responses to attempt to distinguish the course of alternative
uses responding from consequences responding. There are three
distinct predictions that follow from such analyses and the
information reviewed in previous sections. First, the serial order
effect for alternative uses responding seems to be a function of
the early reliance on episodic retrieval and then the continued
use of episodic and semantic simulation to derive more and more
remote associations between known properties of objects and
novel uses for those objects. Given that the consequences task
often results in “new” responses, whichmay indicate that episodic
memory is less of a factor, we hypothesize that the serial order
effect should either be flatter for consequences responses. That is,
it may be that when responding to consequences items, instead
of searching quickly for a specific episode (which indeed seems
impossible) participants instead arrive at a consequence through
some type of reasoning (possibly counterfactual reasoning). For
example, if given the prompt to think of [creative] consequences
that would result if humans no longer needed sleep, a participant
might search for knowledge related to sleep, and then use
counterfactual reasoning to derive successive consequences (i.e.,
consider what might [not] happen if those facts about sleep
became false). This, in turn, would yield a potentially more
creative response earlier in the response sequence, thus affecting
the rate of change in the relationship between the order of
responding and creativity (Prediction 1).
The second predicted difference between consequences and
alternative uses responding is in the dynamics of response times.
There are two sub-predictions here. First, if it is the case that
consequences responding is not a simple function of memory
search (i.e., involves counterfactual reasoning, or some other
process), the initial response time for a consequences prompt
should be slower than the initial response time for alternative
uses. Previous analyses suggest that on average people take
between 2 and 4 s to generate their first use in an alternative
uses task (Hass, 2017a). Theories of semantic memory search
suggest that this initial response latency is a function of the
initial encoding of the cue, and the initialization of search
processes (Wixted and Rohrer, 1994). If this initial encoding for
consequences responding also involves counterfactual reasoning
(or other processes), then the latency to the first response
should be longer. Second, if it is the case that the consequences
responding continually requires new creation of counterfactual
consequences, the rate of responding should also be affected. As
reviewed, Hass (2017a) showed that alternative uses responding
is consistent with the negative exponential rate of search that
is typical of semantic memory search. Explanations for the
negative exponential rate usually center around the fact that
semantic memory is a finite store and repeated search and
recall of information will lead to a depletion of to-be-recalled
information, exponentially slowing search. If it is the case that
consequences responding does not simply involve search and
retrieval from episodic and semantic stores, then a negative
exponential function is not likely to fit response times. This also
follows from the analysis by Xu (2017), which showed that when
participants are constrained to only generating “new” alternative
uses responses (i.e., avoiding the initial reliance on episodic
stores), the cumulative response function appears more linear
than exponential. More specifically, the rate of the cumulative
response function is slower in the latter case. Since Madore
et al. (2016) demonstrated that consequences response arrays
are dominated by “new” responses, then consequences response
curves should also be more linear than alternative uses response
curves.
The final prediction tested in this analysis involves the
semantic similarity of successive responses. In ordinary memory
search using free-recall paradigms (e.g., naming all the animals
one knows), participants often generate clusters of similar
responses in short succession (e.g., farm animals such as
cow, pig, goat, etc.). Several explanations for the phenomenon
exist that are out of the scope of the current paper (cf.
Gruenewald and Lockhead, 1980; Herrmann and Pearle, 1981;
Troyer et al., 1997; Hills et al., 2012; Abbott et al., 2015), but
generally pertain to the question of whether memory itself is a
clustered representation, and/or whether search processes exploit
certain features of the memory store. Hass (2017a) showed
that clustering is not as readily apparent in Alternative Uses
responding, though there was some relationship between inter-
response time (IRT) and human rated similarity. However, since
alternative uses responding relies to some extent on known
associations, semantic similarity should be more strongly related
to IRT in that task compared with the consequences task. This
prediction is more tentative since it is plausible that both analyses
show a weak relationship between IRT and semantic similarity,
but the prediction is consistent with the prior research on the
differential contributions of episodic memory to the two tasks.
The above logic is dependent upon the type of instructions
used in the tasks. Two recent analyses showed that instructions
to “be creative” while generating divergent thinking responses
(as opposed to instructions to “think of as many responses
as possible”) leads to lower output totals (Nusbaum et al.,
2014; Forthmann et al., 2016), but higher creativity ratings.
The boost in creativity is moderated by fluid intelligence, with
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more intelligent seemingly being better able to jump to more
“creative” strategies (Nusbaum et al., 2014) throughout the task.
In addition, the number of associations afforded by each DT
prompt word (indexed by word-frequency) affected fluency, and
to a lesser extent creativity and interacted with instruction type
(Forthmann et al., 2016). So clearly, the type of instructions
given to participants affects the kinds of memory processes in
question here. In this paper, we opted to provide a middle ground
between “be-creative” and “be-fluent” instructions because we
used a 3-min time limit, but wanted to elicit an adequate number
of responses per person for the purposes of evaluating the
negative-exponential model of recall. This decision impacts the
interpretation of our results and will be discussed later.
The novel components of this study include the various
methods used to probe the predictions described above, which
are not commonly applied to DT data. In addition, a web
application was created to obtain the data. The app, which will
be described in the section 2, relies on software created by
the psiTurk project (McDonnell et al., 2012), a free and open-
source set of python code that allows for experimental data to
be collected in a controlled manner using participants recruited
from MTurk. As will be described, the app and several helper
functions are freely available to be adapted for use and can
be downloaded from OSF and from the psiTurk experiment
exchange (via github). The novelty of this component is that it
allows researchers that may lack on-campus labs and participant
pools to obtain reliable data regarding the cognitive processes
involved in creative idea generation. The psiTurk code acts as
an interface between user-generated HTML and JavaScript code
and the MTurk platform, and several helpful features of that
code enable controls on participants’ workflow. In addition, the
psiTurk code allows for data management and storage without
the usual databasing infrastructure overhead that is needed for
other apps and web interfaces. In this way, the novelty of the
web app pertains to its ability to provide tools to small labs and
independent researchers that might not otherwise be available to
them.
2. METHODS
2.1. Participants
Seventy-two participants (49 females) were recruited from
MTurk. Participants were paid $2US for successful completion of
the experiment (i.e., accepting the HIT onMturk, and proceeding
through the entire experiment). Ages ranged from 19 to 69
years (M = 38.96, SD = 12.29) and 79% of the participants
were caucasian (8% African American, 4% Hispanic/Latino, 9%
Other). All participants consented to participate electronically,
and the experimental procedure was approved by the first
author’s Institutional Review Board.
2.2. Materials
The experimental materials consisted of the experimental
web-app, coded in JavaScript, the HTML pages that supported
other parts of the experiment, and the supporting Python
code that interfaced with MTurk. All are available via
the psiTurk experiment exchange (http://psiturk.org/ee/
PaY8pUQXu2yd2wraXHEiLA). Information and tutorials about
the process of creating an experiment using psiTurk are available
at http://psiturk.org.
2.2.1. Physical Features of the psiTurk app
The web-app was written in JavaScript, and was laid out similar
to a Matlab experiment used in previous studies (e.g., Hass,
2017a). Main instruction pages were presented to the participant
along with specific instruction pages that preceded the two
experimental blocks (one for alternative uses and the other for
consequences), all with adequate font size. While responding,
the cue was present on the screen in large font, and underneath
the cue was a response field (an HTML text-entry field) labeled
with the following text: “type responses here; press ENTER after
EACH response.” Participants had full control of the response
field with their keyboard and could use the backspace button to
edit a response before pressing enter. When ENTER was pressed,
the response field cleared so that the next response could be
entered. When all tasks were completed, a survey page appeared
with questions about age, sex, ethnicity, and a rating scale for
engagement in the task (1 = not at all engaging; 10 = very
engaging). A submit button appeared at the bottom of the survey
page, which submitted the work to MTurk, and thanked the
participant for participating.
In addition to collecting information about the type of
browser the participant was using, when each browser event
occurred (e.g., pressing a submit button), the main experimental
data of interest were collected via the text-entry field. JavaScript
functions were implemented to record the elapsed time between
the presentation of the prompt and the first keypress for each
response (response time), the latency between the first keypress
of a response and the pressing of ENTER (entry time), and
the actual text typed (response). Response time and the actual
responses served as the primary data for analysis. Entry time was
retained but not analyzed for this study.
2.2.2. Creativity and Similarity Ratings
In addition to the response times collected via the app, 3
independent sets of ratings were obtained for the responses
participants entered. Two raters were recruited from MTurk
following the procedure detailed by Hass et al. (2018). Raters
were supplied with two 5-point semantic differential scales,
one created for Alternative Uses responses, and the other
created for Consequences responses. As described by Hass and
colleagues, the wording of the semantic differentials was created
to assess how creative the responses were vis a vis the process
by which the responses were generated. Raters were supplied
with spreadsheets, one per prompt, and assigned a rating to
each unique response from each prompt. Inter-rater reliability
was evaluated using the intra-class coefficient, with guidelines
for interpretation supplied by Cicchetti (2001). The inter-rater
reliability estimates for Alternative Uses prompts ranged from
fair to good (Brick ICC(2,2) = 0.50, Hammer ICC(2,2) = 0.70,
Car Tire ICC(2,2) = 0.49). Inter-rater reliability estimates from
Consequences prompts were generally fair (No Gravity ICC(2,2)
= 0.52, 12-Inches ICC(2,2) = 0.48, No Sleep ICC(2,2) = 0.49).
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A separate set of two raters provided ratings of similarity on
a 4-point semantic differential (Hass, 2017a). These raters were
not recruited from MTurk, but were undergraduate research
assistants at the first author’s institution. The raters were supplied
with spreadsheets that gave the order of response, the participant
who generated the response, and a blank cell to indicate
the similarity between each pair of successive responses per
participant per prompt. These raters achieved good to excellent
reliability (Brick ICC(2,2) = 0.77, Hammer ICC(2,2) = 0.77, Car
Tire ICC(2,2) = 0.85; No Gravity ICC(2,2) = 0.68, 12-Inches
ICC(2,2) = 0.81, No Sleep ICC(2,2) = 0.79).
2.3. Procedure
MTurk is a service where “human intelligence tasks” (HITs) are
posted with descriptions and an offer of payment. The psiTurk
command line interface allows for posting batches of HITs,
which appear on MTurk as ads. When a participant clicks on
a HIT, a brief description is presented. For this experiment, the
description advertised that this was an experiment about creative
thinking in which there were going to think of creative ideas for
six different prompts. They were also told that the experiment
should last about 30 min. Once a participant “accepted” the HIT
(meaning that he or she intended to participate), he or she was
allotted 60 min to actually complete the experiment. Generally,
if MTurkers participants do not leave enough time to finish
HITs, they are free to “release” them for another MTurker to
accept. Sixty minutes wasmore than enough time for participants
to accept and complete the hit, and only two people failed to
submit their work within the 60 min time period, both of which
waited too long between accepting the HIT and beginning the
experiment.
Immediately upon beginning the HIT, a pop-up appeared in a
participant’s browser containing a consent form, which could also
be printed. To give consent, participants simply clicked “I agree,”
and the experiment was launched. Two general instruction pages
were then loaded, the first screen explained that there would be 6
experimental trials lasting 3 min each, and a practice trial lasting
30 s. The second screen explained that the experiment required
them to type on their keyboard, and that the experiment would
be split into 3 blocks, the 30-s practice block, and two 9-min
experimental blocks. They were told that they could take short
breaks between blocks, but reminded that they must finish the
HIT within the allotted time.
Each block, including the practice block, contained additional
instructions specific to the task. For the practice block,
instructions were provided about the experimental interface, that
it would contain a cue and a response field where they were to
continue to type responses until the cue changed. They were told
that the practice block was simply designed to orient them to
the use of the response field. The practice prompt was to type
“all the colors [you] know.” Participants were reminded in the
instructions, and on the text-entry page to type enter after each
response, and to keep thinking of responses for the entire time. A
START button was visible on the bottom of the instruction page,
and clicking it began the practice trial.
At the end of the practice block, and each subsequent
block, the prompt field was cleared from the screen and a
message appeared for 5 s, stating, “Good job! The next task is
loading, please wait.” Another instruction page appeared for each
experimental block, and participants were told that they could
take a short break, but reminded that the HIT would expire in 60
min. The experiment did not proceed until the participant read
the instructions for the block and clicked a START button on the
bottom.
The order of the experimental blocks was counterbalanced:
half of the participants began with the Alternative Uses prompts,
and the other half began with the Consequences prompts. Within
each block, the order of the prompts were randomized by
JavaScript. The instructions for the Alternative Uses block read:
In the next set of tasks, the goal is to think of uses for objects.
Please be as creative as you like. When you press Start, the name
of a that object will appear on the screen. As soon as you think
of something, type it into the field and press ENTER. Do this as
many times as you can in 3 min. After 3 min on one category, the
prompt will change to a new category, and after the next 3 min a
third category will appear. This phase will last 9 min. Remember,
it is important to try to keep thinking of responses and to type
them in for the entire time for each prompt. Please type them in
one at a time as they come to you, and press enter after entering
each one.
The instructions for the Consequences block was similar, with
the following change: participants were told that “a statement
will appear on the screen. The statement might be something
like imagine that humans walked with their hands. For 3 min, try
to think of any and all consequences that might result from the
statement. Please be as creative as you like.”
The prompts for the Alternative Uses task were brick, hammer,
and car tire, and the prompts for the Consequences task were to
imagine the consequences of “humans no longer needing sleep,”
“humans becoming 12 inches tall,” and “gravity ceasing to exist.”
On the text-entry page for Alternative Uses prompts, the text read
“How can you use a(n) OBJECT?” to remind the participants
that they must generate uses, not just associates for the object.
On the text-entry page for Consequences prompts, the text read
“What would happen if SCENARIO?”, again to remind them to
generate consequences. In each case, the name of the object,
or the scenario appeared in capital letters. Custom JavaScript
functions recorded the response time (initial keypress), entry
time (latency between initial keypress and pressing ENTER), and
the actual text of each response. Data were saved to a dynamic
MySQL instance hosted on Amazon Web Services, and parsed
using a set of customized R functions which are downloadable
here.
Prompts remained on the screen for 3min, andwere separated
by a 5-s break, in which the prompt field cleared as well as
the text-entry box, and a message stated “Good job! The next
prompt is loading.” At the end of the final experimental block,
the screen again displayed the “Good job” message, and the post-
experiment questionnaire. Participants indicated their responses
to questions about age, gender, ethnicity, and task engagement
using drop-down menus. When they were finished, they pressed
the submit button, and a thank-you message appeared on the
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for fluency (number of responses) across prompts
(AU, Alternative Uses; C, Consequences, see text for full description of prompts).
Prompt Mean SD Median Skew Kurtosis
Brick (AU) 10.12 4.52 10 0.86 0.71
Hammer (AU) 9.52 4.36 9 0.73 −0.07
Car Tire (AU) 9.39 4.37 9 0.79 0.51
12-Inches (C) 8.42 3.60 8 0.50 −0.49
No Gravity (C) 7.91 3.83 7 1.00 1.27
No Sleep (C) 8.84 4.53 6 0.91 0.26
screen. They were then directed back to MTurk, and received
payment when the batch of HITs was completed and approved.
All participants that submitted results successfully back to
MTurk were paid, regardless of whether they completed the task
correctly. Inspection of the data revealed one instance of an
error in the logging of responses and 4 instances of participants
neglecting to press ENTER to log responses. Thus, the final
sample size was 67 participants.
3. RESULTS
All data and analysis scripts and functions are available via
the first author’s Open Science Framework (osf.io/eux2k). Data
parsing and analysis was performed using the R Statistical
Programming Language (R Core Team, 2016), including the
following packages: psych (Revelle, 2017), RMySQL (Ooms et al.,
2017), jsonlite (Ooms, 2014), dplyr (Wickham et al., 2017), lme4
(Bates et al., 2015), lattice (Sarkar, 2008), and ggplot2 (Wickham,
2009). In all sections below, response times (RTs) represented the
time between the presentation of the prompt and the time of the
initial keypress leading to each response. This is consistent with
recall studies that use voice-key technology to record response
times, which are then defined according to the time of the initial
voice onset of each response (e.g., Rohrer et al., 1995).
Four statistical analyses were planned: a descriptive analysis
of the relationship between cumulative response counts and
elapsed time (cumulative RT), a test of the difference in time
to the first response (initial RT) across the two prompt types, a
test of whether the relationship between pairwise similarity and
inter-response time (IRT) differed by prompt-type, and a test of
whether the serial order effect varied by prompt type. To aid
interpretation of these analyses, descriptive statistics for fluency
across the 6 prompts are listed in Table 1. Notably, fluency was,
on average, significantly larger for Alternative Uses prompts (M
= 9.68, SD = 4.01) than for Consequences prompts (M = 8.39, SD
= 3.49), t(66) = 3.44, p = 0.00, d = 0.42.
3.1. Cumulative Response Curves by
Prompt
The purpose of this is to examine whether there are differences
in the cumulative response function across tasks. In Figure 1
plots of the average number of responses given by participants
across successive 10-s blocks are shown. The plot is imprecise,
such that toward the end of the interval, some of the slower
participants had generated few responses, which resulted in the
fluctuations seen on the right hand side of the plot. However,
the plot suggests that a negatively accelerating cumulative RT
function should provide an adequate fit to individual data across
the prompts.
The function that is often used to approximate the trends seen
in Figure 1 is an exponential function, in which the cumulative
number of responses at time t is a curvilinear function that
flattens out (reaches an asymptote) as time grows. The function
was first derived by Bousfield and Sedgewick (1944) and is
given by:
R(t) = a ∗ (1− e−λt) (1)
where R(t) is the cumulative number of responses at time t
and e is the exponential function. The constant a represents
the “asymptotic level of responding” or the total number of
items available for retrieval (Bousfield and Sedgewick, 1944). The
constant λ is the rate of the exponential decay (deceleration), and
was parameterized in terms of the inverse relation λ = 1
τ
. In this
parameterization, τ is the theoretical mean response time, which
is a more interpretable parameter than λ in this context. Though
Wixted and Rohrer (1994) suggested that τ can provide an index
of search set size, here, mathematically, a larger τ represents a
more linear cumulative response function (Xu, 2017), which was
of interest in this analysis. In both cases, a larger τ represents
a smaller λ, and following Bousfield and Sedgewick (1944) the
equation represents the proportion of to be retrieved items left to
be sampled at time t (see also Gruenewald and Lockhead, 1980).
Following from earlier work (Hass, 2017a; Xu, 2017),
nonlinear least squares estimates of the asymptote (a) and
mean response time (τ ) were obtained for each participant
using the “nls” function in R. Table 2 gives the quartiles of
these estimates, for each prompt. Participants with fewer than
3 responses per prompt were excluded, but only for that
prompt. In addition, as Table 2 illustrates, a few additional
participants’ estimates were not returned due to failure of
the nls algorithm to converge. The results in Table 2 are
consistent with Figure 1, in that the largest of the estimates
of the τ parameter came from RTs for the Consequences of
being 12 inches tall prompt. The results also illustrate that the
exponential model predicts higher theoretical totals for fluency
for the Consequences prompts than were actually observed
(Table 1). These results are all consistent with Consequences
prompts producing more linear cumulative response curves than
Alternative Uses prompts.
A statistical test for the last assertion is difficult to perform
because due to the nature of nonlinear least squares estimates.
However, a statistical test of the difference among the various
response curves is possible using the discretized data that were
the basis for Figure 1 in a mixed-effects regression model.
The dependent variable in this model is cumulative responding
with a discrete, integer predictor indexing which of the 18
10-s bins a response was output. A quadratic term for time-
bin was added to the model to approximate the curvature of
the exponential function. To test for the variation in curve
shapes, the model included a fixed-effect of prompt (coded as
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FIGURE 1 | Plot of the Mean number of cumulative responses in successive 10 s blocks. Alternative Uses prompts: brick, hammer, tire; Consequences prompts:
gravity, inches, sleep (see section 2 for full description).
TABLE 2 | Median, Q1 and Q3 for the nonlinear least-squares estimates of
asymptotic responding level (a), mean response time (τ ) across prompts (AU,
Alternative Uses; C, Consequences, see text for full description of prompts).
Prompt n a estimates τ estimates
Q1 Median Q3 Q1 Median Q3
Brick (AU) 63 7.85 10.80 16.72 31.72 51.24 86.01
Hammer (AU) 59 7.97 10.80 16.20 33.63 64.05 107.98
Car Tire (AU) 59 8.17 11.24 18.50 38.26 65.53 121.26
12-Inches (C) 57 8.58 12.04 18.73 66.97 102.90 172.05
No Gravity (C) 59 7.40 10.03 14.81 41.97 77.68 143.89
No Sleep (C) 56 6.97 10.13 18.61 51.08 87.78 164.49
The scale of a is number of responses, whereas τ is reported in seconds.
a treatment contrast with the Brick task as the baseline) along
with a cross-level interaction between the quadratic time-bin
and prompt. Random intercepts and slopes per participant per
prompt were also modeled. The numeric results are given in
Table 3. Not surprisingly, the coefficients for linear and quadratic
time-bin were significant, along with contrasts for output total.
Importantly, the interactions between prompt and the quadratic
time-bin term were significant for the No Gravity and 12-Inches
prompt, with negative coefficients illustrating that these curves
had less pronounced quadratic components (i.e., they were more
linear) than the Brick curve. The curve for the No Sleep prompt
did not significantly differ in it’s quadratic component. Thus,
there is evidence that cumulative response times are more linear
for 2 of the Consequences prompts compared to the Brick
prompt.
3.2. First Response Latency by Condition
As an additional test of the processing differences between
Alternative Uses and Consequences items, the RTs for first
responses on the three Alternative Uses prompts were averaged,
as were the RTs for the first responses to the 3 Consequences
prompts. This seemed feasible given the results above, that all
6 prompts are well approximated by the exponential function,
with varying parameters. The RT averages were skewed, due
mainly to a few participants who took a long time to begin
responding (which was later found to be a flaw in the design
of the app). To test for a difference in initial RT across the
tasks, without an assumption of normality, a Wilcoxon signed
rank test (with continuity correction) was performed in R. The
test was significant such that initial RTs were shorter for the
Alternative Uses prompts than for the consequences prompts,
z = −2.16, p = 0.03, r = −0.26. The effect size is small
to medium using Cohen’s (1988) guidelines for effect size r
(Fritz et al., 2012), suggesting that there may be a small increase
in initial processing involved when generating responses to
Consequences prompts.
3.3. Pairwise Similarity by Prompt
The third planned analysis examined the relationship between
pairwise similarity and IRT. Theoretically, if the Alternative
Uses task involves searching through a memory store that is
more highly clustered, there should be a stronger relationship
between pairwise similarity and IRT for those prompts compared
with Consequences prompts. That is, theoretically, short IRTs
would indicate less remote association between successive
responses. The consequences task, which may depend only on
semantic memory, and also on other reasoning processes, should
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TABLE 3 | Results of the Mixed-effects regression model of the RT curves, with
cumulative response total as the dependent variable and 10-s block number as
the discrete RT variable.
Fixed effects Coefficient t p
Intercept 0.72
RT (discrete) 1.04 49.55 <0.001
RT-quadratic −0.02 −12.48 <0.001
No Gravity −1.16 −4.58 <0.001
Hammer −0.62 −2.35 0.022
12-Inches −1.46 −5.49 <0.001
No Sleep −1.37 −4.99 <0.001
Car Tire −0.91 −3.19 0.002
No Gravity*RT-quadratic −0.008 −6.71 <0.001
Hammer*RT-quadratic −0.003 −2.69 0.007
12-Inches*RT-quadratic −0.007 −6.41 <0.001
No Sleep*RT-quadratic −0.002 −1.88 0.060
Car Tire*RT-quadratic −0.002 −1.71 0.087
Random effects Variance
Participant 2.88
No Gravity 3.40
Hammer 3.81
12-Inches 3.86
No Sleep 4.16
Car Tire 4.47
Residual 2.20
The baseline level for the contrasts was the Brick prompt.
theoretically have a looser relationship between IRT and pairwise
similarity. That hypothesis was tested by fitting a linear mixed
effects model, with pairwise similarity rating as the dependent
variable, IRT as a level-1 independent variable, and prompt-
type (Uses v. Consequences) as a level-2 variable (fixed effect).
Random intercepts for prompt (all 6 levels) and participant were
included in the model to account for the repeated measures
nature of the design. Modeling a cross-over interaction between
prompt-type and IRT did not improve the fit of this model
[χ2
(1)
= 0.20, p = 0.65], meaning that there was no significant
difference in the slope of the IRT - similarity relationship across
the two prompt types.
Table 4 contains the full results of the model with no
interaction term. The fixed effect of condition was not significant
indicating a non-significant difference in average pairwise
similarity across the two prompt types. However, the IRT -
similarity association was significant, such that as IRTs increased,
pairwise similarity tended to decrease. Figure 2 illustrates these
trends, and also shows that indeed, there seems to be little
difference in the IRT-similarity slopes. However, the Figure
also illustrates a clear nonlinear pattern in the results: short
IRTs show a variety of different pairwise similarity values,
but as IRTs increased, similarity decreases. Indeed, a quantile-
quantile plot of residuals suggested that the model over-predicts
pairwise similarity for short IRTs, and under-predicts pairwise
similarity for long IRTs. So a more conservative conclusion is
TABLE 4 | Results of the Mixed-effects regression model with pairwise similarity
as the dependent variable.
Fixed effects Coefficient t p
Intercept 2.12 18.260
IRT −0.01 −8.50 < 0.001
Prompt-type −0.20 −1.30 0.25
Random effects Variance
Participant 0.038
Prompt 0.036
Residual 0.784
Consequences was the baseline Prompt-Type. The random effect of Prompt is the
variance component across all 6 prompts.
that the relationship between IRT and pairwise similarity does
not systematically vary by prompt-type, and that the linearity of
the relationship may be overstated by the model. Contrary to
the hypothesis, the two tasks seem to show the same degree of
relationship between IRT and pairwise similarity.
3.4. Serial Order by Task
The final question asked in this analysis was whether the serial
order effect varied by prompt type. Again, a mixed-effects model
was fit, this time with creativity ratings as the dependent variable,
the order of the response as the level-1 predictor, and a level-2
predictor for prompt-type (Alternative uses vs. Consequences).
Response order was rescaled with the first response denoted by
0. To remove the potential of outliers (highly fluent individuals)
to affect these results, serial order analysis was limited to the first
14 responses. This value was chosen because 95% of participants
gave 14 or fewer responses on the consequences prompts. The
95th percentile of fluency for the Alternative uses prompts was
around 17. To make this analyses equitable, the smaller of the
two values was chosen.
Again, random intercepts for prompt-type and participant
were included to model the repeated measures nature of the
design. Following Beaty and Silvia (2012), both linear and
quadratic order effects were modeled. An interaction between
prompt type and the linear serial order term did not improve
the model fit [χ2
(1)
= 1.04, p = 0.31], nor did a quadratic serial
order term improve the fit [χ2
(1)
= 0.86, p = 0.35]. So the best
model was that including a linear serial order term and a fixed-
effect of prompt type, along with the random intercepts described
above. The quantile-quantile plot of the residuals from this model
suggested that the residuals did conform to normality, unlike
the IRT model. Table 5 contains the full output from the final
model. There are significant linear and quadratic trends, which
replicates the results of earlier serial order effects analyses (Beaty
and Silvia, 2012). In addition, the ratings from Alternative Uses
tasks were significantly lower at the onset of responding, but
with no interaction, Figure 3 illustrates that serial order effects
are the same, albeit offset for the two prompt types. As such,
it seems that participants begin with more creative responses
to the Consequences prompts compared to the Alternative Uses
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FIGURE 2 | Scatter plots of inter-response time and pairwise similarity for the two prompt conditions. Solid line represents ordinary least squares regression. See
Table 3 for the actual regression results from mixed-effects modeling.
TABLE 5 | Results of the Mixed-effects regression model of the serial order effect
(Creativity as the dependent variable).
Fixed effects Coefficient t p
Intercept 2.598
Order (linear) 0.139 12.93 < 0.001
Order (quadratic) −0.008 -8.94 < 0.001
Prompt-type −0.554 −4.18 0.006
Random effects Variance
Participant 0.026
Prompt 0.026
Residual 0.456
Consequences was the baseline Prompt-Type. The random effect of Prompt is the
variance component across all 6 prompts.
prompts, but that the serial order effect remains in tact for both
prompt types.
4. DISCUSSION
The present study was motivated by theoretical and practical
issues. The theoretical motivations will be discussed first in
light of the data. To address a hole in the burgeoning research
on memory processes in creative thinking, the Alternative
Uses task was compared to the Consequences task using a
variety of metrics derived from existing analyses of memory
retrieval. A recent analysis (Madore et al., 2016) suggested
that the Consequences task may be less dependent on well-
learned episodic information, and the results of this analysis are
consistent with that interpretation. First, in Figure 1, the rate of
exponential growth of cumulative responses on the consequences
prompts was, on average, slower. This can be seen for example, by
examining the points where t = 60. There are clearly two clusters
of points, the bottom of which consist of the mean cumulative
number of responses for the 3 consequences prompts, which
appear nearly 2 units lower than the three points representing
the 3 alternative uses prompts. The separation between these
points begins around 20 s, and is clear through about 70 s,
where the mean cumulative responses become more variable.
The individual fits of the exponential response time function in
Table 2 confirm along with the regression analysis that for at least
2 of the consequences prompts, output was more linear. This is
consistent with Xu’s results that when participants are instructed
only to generate “new” Alternative Uses for objects in a creative
task, the rate of exponential growth (1/τ ) of the response time
function is slower, as it was here for Consequences responding.
Xu also showed that when constraining participants to think of
only “new” uses, their output totals are smaller, which is again
consistent with the current analysis.
The slower rate of responding may be a function of additional
processes operating during the Consequences task, such the
initial time to respond to consequences prompts was significantly
longer than the initial response time for alternative uses
prompts. This suggests that either the encoding of the cue
and initial search of memory takes longer for consequences
prompts, or that in addition to encoding the cue and searching
memory, consequences responding requires additional cognitive
processing to continue. Unfortunately, the current analysis could
not disentangle encoding from additional processes, but it is
likely that future behavioral or neuroscientific studies will be
able to do so. As mentioned, one candidate process involves
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FIGURE 3 | Data (dots) and model predictions (line) for the serial order effects across the two prompt types. Note that the order of responses was re-scaled with 0 as
the first response.
counterfactual reasoning about the impossible events represented
by consequences prompts. However, it is also likely that the
Consequences tasks are executively more demanding, and that
it is an executive slow-down that is occurring, rather than a
superposition of memory and reasoning processes.
Finally, the results of the serial order analysis provide further
evidence that during consequences generation, participants
are better able to generate more creative responses from
the beginning of the response interval. However, there was
still a serial order effect for Consequences prompts, meaning
that remote association may form the core of Consequences
generation, as it does for Alternative Uses generation. That
interpretation is supported by the lack of a difference in the
relationship between inter response time (IRT) and pairwise
similarity across the two types of prompts. Though the IRT-
similarity relationship does not seem to be linear, the amount
of pairwise similarity did not vary significantly across the two
types of prompts. This suggests that either the type of knowledge
accessed during generation of both types of ideas is not likely
to be strongly associated with other knowledge to the task, or
that some executive process intervenes to override local cues
during the generation of creative responses (cf. Troyer et al.,
1997; Hills et al., 2012; Hass, 2017a). An answer to that question
rests upon further analysis of the existence of semantic clusters
of responses in these arrays, which is beyond the scope of the
current study. Indeed, while norms exist to identify clusters in
semantic categories such as animals (Troyer et al., 1997) there
are currently no published norms for Alternative Uses responses,
and norms for Consequences responses are proprietary. Though
many researchers use their own systems for categorizing DT
responses (for the purposes of flexibility scoring), a normative
system for such categorization would be helpful to further probe
the regularities of the search process involved by enabling more
thorough computational modeling of idea generation.
4.1. Implications for Further Cognitive and
Neuroscientific Studies
In the introduction, several pieces of new research pointing
to a specific set of cortical structures within the default
network supporting creative thinking were reviewed. Because
this network shows reliable activation during tasks involving
episodic retrieval and simulation (Gerlach et al., 2011), it has been
hypothesized that activation of these regions in studies of creative
thinking reflect the involvement of episodic retrieval mechanisms
(Addis et al., 2016; Madore et al., 2017). Perhaps the clearest
evidence for a role of episodic retrieval comes fromMadore et al.
(2017), who found that an episodic specificity induction boosted
performance on the alternate uses task, which corresponded to
increased activity within the left anterior hippocampus of the
default network. Another recent study by Benedek et al. (2018)
found that default network regions (hippocampus and medial
prefrontal cortex) are involved in both the recall of original
object uses and the imagination of novel object uses (i.e., the
generation of “old” and “new” ideas, respectively; Benedek et al.,
2014) compared to a control task that does not require creative
thinking. Contrasting old and new idea generation directly,
however, revealed selective engagement of the left supramarginal
gyrus (SMG) during the generation of new ideas (Benedek
et al., 2014, 2018). In light of the SMG’s role in cognitive
control processes and constrained memory retrieval, Benedek
and colleagues hypothesized that the generation of new ideas
involves more executively-demanding mental simulations that
are less relevant for the retrieval of old ideas from episodic
memory. Critically, however, neuroimaging work has largely
focused on the Alternate Uses task, so the extent to which similar
brain regions are involved in Consequences generation remains
an open question. Taken together with recent behavioral and
neuroimaging work on old and new ideas, the current results
suggest that, because Consequences responses tend to be more
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“new” than “old,” one might expect executive brain regions
to come online to support such complex search and retrieval
processes. This is among the speculations relayed previously
about the Consequences task, and the current results suggest
that it may be advantageous to begin to compare the uses and
consequences prompts in the scanner.
4.2. Practical Considerations for Using
MTurk and Psiturk
Despite the success of this project, and the building of a useable
interface to conduct these kinds of experiments using MTurk
workers, there are a few practical issues to consider in follow-
up studies. First, MTurkers are very sensitive to the directions.
In pilot testing, participants tended to not press ENTER unless
explicitly instructed to do so on the text-entry page, meaning
data were lost. The current app includes instructions which
are very specific and repeatedly remind the participant to press
enter and to continue thinking of responses. Even so, at least 1
participant per prompt exhibited atypical initial response times
(e.g., initial RT> 30 s), which may be due to distraction. Though
the age range of participants on MTurk is larger than that for
normal laboratory based psychology experiments, using MTurk
successfully, and getting work approved usually requires that
people are computer savy. That is, the small number of long
latencies is not expected to be a function of the age of the
participants. Even though one participant reported being 69 year
old, a majority of participants were between the ages of 24 and
50 year old. The relationship between age and initial latency was
not tested, however, and may be a relevant research question for
future studies.
The app, as it is now constructed, does not allow the
participant to take an extended break within an experimental
block, only between blocks. Within a block, the prompt would
change after 3 min plus a 5 s delay. If the participant became
distracted, there was no way for him or her to notice the fact that
the next task started, and latencies were biased by the distraction.
Again, this was rare, but the fact that it happened more than
once means that initial steps must be taken to control the flow
of the program, or to set exclusion criteria. Since exclusion
criteria set prior to the experiment were simply designed to filter
out participants who did not follow directions or who did not
respond to all tasks, it was decided that these atypical latencies
should be retained for transparency. Due to the nature of the
analysis, these latencies did not greatly affect the results, but
the app has been updated to include a button press (space-bar)
between each prompt presentation, so that MTurkers can move
at their own pace.
4.3. Theoretical Limitations and Alternative
Explanations
Aside from practical considerations, a few limitations and
alternative explanations exist. First, the residuals of the linear
mixed-effects regression of similarity on IRT and prompt type
violated the assumption of normal residuals, and the model
may be overshooting the relationship between IRT and pairwise
similarity. As mentioned, the lack of norms for responses on
both kinds of prompts used in this study makes other IRT
analyses difficult, but such analyses are necessary before firmer
conclusions are made about the IRT-similarity relationship
during creative thinking tasks. As an alternative, ordinal
multilevel regression models could be used, as the similarity scale
can be treated as ordinal. For example, Forthmann et al. (2016)
used linear response trees to examine the interaction of word
frequency and be-creative instructions with very interpretable
results.
In addition, there may be an alternative explanation for
the difference in creativity ratings between Alternative Uses
and Consequences responses. The rating scales used to rate
the responses do differ with respect to the scoring criteria in
a nature relevant to this difference in response length. For
consequences responses, the maximum creativity rating for
consequences responses (5 out of 5) is “very imaginative/detailed
consequence”, while the maximum creativity rating for uses is
“very imaginative / re-contextualized use.” The rationale for the
difference between the two is that the scores are then specific
to the goals of the tasks. In constructing those scales, it was
reasoned that a very creative consequence should be one in
which a detailed thought process was carried out. However,
Consequences responses may simply earn higher ratings because
they contain a greater number of words on average (Forthmann
et al., 2017). This issue of scoring differences across creative
thinking tasks is at the heart of a larger debate in creativity
about domain-specificity (Baer, 2011). That said, the participants
were not aware of the criteria used for rating their responses,
and are not explicitly told to be detailed in the responses to
either task. So from that perspective, the fact that Consequences
responses tend to be longer seems to be related to the nature
of the prompt rather than an artifact of the rating procedure.
Still more research into the reasoning processes that underpin
the Consequences task is necessary to shed more light on this
issue.
Finally, the instructions given to participants deviated from
the “be creative” instructions used in more recent studies.
The choice was made to use the current instructions in
order to facilitate higher fluency totals. This, however, is a
limitation of the method, as it can be argued that instructing
participants to “be creative as [they] like[d]” leaves open the
question as to whether all participants interpreted the tasks
in the same way. This is an important caveat, though the
results are in line with predictions based on studies that
used “be creative” instructions. It would be advantageous,
however, to investigate whether the exponential parameters
fit to RT data in the current study would change when
“be creative” instructions are used, compared to “be fluent”
instructions.
4.4. Concluding Remarks
The goals of this study were both practical and theoretical.
On the practical side, a workable web interface for collecting
creative thinking data from MTurk workers is now available to
the scientific research community. Moreover, the data generated
by participants in the web environment are consistent with data
generated in the lab (cf. Hass, 2015, 2017a), and can be used
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to test cognitive hypotheses. This is a novel development as
it can allow for researchers with limited lab space and lack
of participant pools to collect valuable data about cognitive
processing in divergent thinking. In addition, since MTurkers
represent a more wide-ranging demographic than undergraduate
participant pools, the results may be more externally valid.
On the theoretical side, the results suggest that both
Alternative Uses and Consequences tasks tap the same general
processes, and conform to the serial order effect. This is
a novel result as the serial order effect has never been
explored with Consequences prompts. However, there were
subtle differences such that the initial processing time for
Consequences responding is slightly longer than Alternative
Uses, and Consequences responses seem to earn higher creativity
ratings from the start of the idea generation process. The latter
effect may due to additional reasoning required to either search
for or evaluate potential Consequences before they are output.
Evidence from cumulative RT analysis provides some support
for that assertion, but it is hoped that future research with
computational models and brain imaging techniques will provide
more insight. At the same time, both Alternative Uses and
Consequences tasks can continue to be used as measures of
divergent thinking.
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